Where is The European Economic Crisis Going? I wish I knew the answer to this question. It would permit me to speculate, and perhaps become rich. The central issue is no longer the Greek economy, or Greece's inability to control its debt and budget deficit. Greece is now merely the light with which the overall crisis is being illuminated. The core issue may be the fact that, given our level of knowledge about the crisis, no one has the slightest idea what the euro is worth. The daily valuations of the euro on world currency markets amount to blind wanderings, and will continue thus until the markets are satisfied that the true depth and breadth of the crisis are known.
Here's a very little history. In the beginning, entry into the European common currency zone was to be restricted to those countries that could keep their annual budget deficits under three percent of GDP. This, plus a lick and a prayer, would be enough to bind together such disparate economies and cultures as Italy and Germany. Italy, where paying taxes is approached with good natured humor, and little compliance; Germany, where taxes are paid, and inflation is considered the ultimate enemy. There seemed to be no question that all EU members would be welcome in the eurozone, even before any had complied with the deficit requirement. We can't, at this point, prove that any eurozone countries weren't in compliance when they adopted the euro. However, we can prove that very few of these countries have kept their deficits under three percent of GDP for more than a year since adoption. It's a similar smoke and mirror routine to that employed in the United States, to disguise the size of the annual budget deficit.
Here's a little current reality. Every time the EU lifts its skirt to show a bit more of the truth, we see just a little more than we were supposed to see. Have Spain and Portugal really “fixed” their deficit problems quite so easily, with so much less unrest than Greece has, and is suffering? We will eventually have to know.
Want a little reinforcement? On 16 May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that (with the bail out fund) “we have done nothing more than to buy time until we have brought order to these competitive differences and to the budget deficits of individual euro countries.” Competitive differences, eh? Who knew that there were competitive differences between the German and Greek economies. I'd like to hear the barest outline of a plan to “bring order” to that.
Until the full extent of he eurozone sovereign debt crisis is understood, there is no way to value the euro. If the crisis, and information deficit, persist for much more than a month, the euro could easily reach parity with the dollar. That would be quite a fall. In fact, it could become a free fall.
Peace and love.
Sunday, May 16, 2010
Thursday, May 13, 2010
The End of America's Time
A supposedly smart person recently remarked to me that the United States, in many ways, resembled England after World War II. She spoke of England groaning under her war debt after 1945, and her final realization, during the Suez crisis, that the empire was finished. All this is true, but it may not correspond that well to the United States' current position. All the above is true, but England was really done after World War I. She had a great fleet in being, and a remarkable empire that was at or near its maximum reach. Her traditional enemy, Germany, was prostrate, and on the verge of experiencing revolution and inflation that is still the example of what to most fear in economic policy.
England had crushing war debts, much of it to the United States. She repudiated much of them, which earned her no new friends across the Atlantic. But the final, crushing blow was the League of Nations, whose mandates gave England sway over former Ottoman provinces that were nothing but trouble. Elie Khedouri, in “The Chatham House Version,” describes how England desperately wanted to be free of these mandates well before they were scheduled to expire, for they were costing her dearly, at a time when she could ill afford the cost. One result of England's burden was her inability to rearm in the face of a rearming Germany. In fact, even before Germany began rearming, the British Parliament had passed the secret Ten Years Rule, or Pernicious Law (as its opponents called it). The Ten Years Law stated that England could count on ten years warning for a major war, hence, there was no need to further arm or modernize the military until such warning was received. The law was renewed each year (also in secret), pushing the ten year window one more year into the future. That didn't work out too well for them.
The United States has no mandates such as England had, but we do have active and serious military commitments throughout the world. These commitments are crushing. Additionally, every world wide humanitarian crisis demands US attention, both in terms of direct aid, and broad (and expensive) logistics support. It's possible that most of the world doesn't realize the magnitude of the task to move thousands of tons of supplies, whether munitions or food aid, from one point to another in rapid order. The United States has done this frequently, during humanitarian crises going back to 1947. The expense is immense; the cost comes right out of the defense budget. The great expense of flying large quantities of material is lost on most people, but it's not just a matter of money. You must have the equipment and expertise, as well. Owning and maintaining the equipment to do all this is, in itself, remarkably expensive. Even if we are reimbursed for the costs of transporting such aid, the wear and tear on our transport capability shortens the service life of equipment, creating additional hidden costs.
Given our debts, our hollowed out industrial infrastructure, and our appetite for more and more domestic spending, there will come a point when, even pictures of starving, beaten women and children on the nightly news will be insufficient to bring forth US aid.
Then, who will be the pillar of the free world.
England had crushing war debts, much of it to the United States. She repudiated much of them, which earned her no new friends across the Atlantic. But the final, crushing blow was the League of Nations, whose mandates gave England sway over former Ottoman provinces that were nothing but trouble. Elie Khedouri, in “The Chatham House Version,” describes how England desperately wanted to be free of these mandates well before they were scheduled to expire, for they were costing her dearly, at a time when she could ill afford the cost. One result of England's burden was her inability to rearm in the face of a rearming Germany. In fact, even before Germany began rearming, the British Parliament had passed the secret Ten Years Rule, or Pernicious Law (as its opponents called it). The Ten Years Law stated that England could count on ten years warning for a major war, hence, there was no need to further arm or modernize the military until such warning was received. The law was renewed each year (also in secret), pushing the ten year window one more year into the future. That didn't work out too well for them.
The United States has no mandates such as England had, but we do have active and serious military commitments throughout the world. These commitments are crushing. Additionally, every world wide humanitarian crisis demands US attention, both in terms of direct aid, and broad (and expensive) logistics support. It's possible that most of the world doesn't realize the magnitude of the task to move thousands of tons of supplies, whether munitions or food aid, from one point to another in rapid order. The United States has done this frequently, during humanitarian crises going back to 1947. The expense is immense; the cost comes right out of the defense budget. The great expense of flying large quantities of material is lost on most people, but it's not just a matter of money. You must have the equipment and expertise, as well. Owning and maintaining the equipment to do all this is, in itself, remarkably expensive. Even if we are reimbursed for the costs of transporting such aid, the wear and tear on our transport capability shortens the service life of equipment, creating additional hidden costs.
Given our debts, our hollowed out industrial infrastructure, and our appetite for more and more domestic spending, there will come a point when, even pictures of starving, beaten women and children on the nightly news will be insufficient to bring forth US aid.
Then, who will be the pillar of the free world.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
The End of Federalism
Educated observers of the United States like to talk about federalism, that is, the relationship between the Federal Government of the United States and individual states. Many wax poetic about the states as laboratories of the democratic process. Let's end such talk right now. Permanently. There are no more states as meaningful legislative entities. What Lincoln began with the Civil War, and Roosevelt refined with the New Deal, has been finished by the post World War II federal government that has a program for absolutely everything, from child health care to high school homework. The federal government may be broke, but the steady stream of money from the US Treasury to the states continues to flow, even if the feds must keep an extra shift on just to print enough of those phony bucks. The Constitution may limit the power of the federal government, but failure of a state to adhere to even one bizarre federal regulation can mean loss of all federal aid. Since the states are equally broke, but unable to print their own money, they must tow the federal line, or lose the federal aid to which they have become highly addicted. The result? There ain't no states. There are jurisdictions where a local government functions by sufferance of Washington, but the states can no longer do ANYTHING if the feds object.
End of song. End of states. Why bother with the fiction? Have a nice day.
End of song. End of states. Why bother with the fiction? Have a nice day.
The Curse of Political Parity
The period roughly stretching from the early 1950s, though the late 1970s, might be described as a political and legislative golden age in the United States. While there were plenty of rough spots, such as the two Cuban crises, Berlin and Vietnam, much good was done by government. The US successfully anchored NATO, countering a serious Soviet threat, nuclear missiles were removed from Cuba, the space exploration program was begun, and reached the moon. Medicare, and the civil rights, and voting rights acts, were passed and signed into law.
What made these many positive milestones possible? A permanent legislative minority. Republicans formed a “loyal opposition”, one that knew it could not achieve majority status in the near term. It's true that the two parties weren't nearly as far apart ideologically as they are now, but the long term minority status of a single party, in a two party system, led to a significant amount of true bipartisan cooperation. With no near term hope of winning a majority of seats in either house, there was no need for continuous legislative conflict in order to try to gain advantage in the next election.
This situation is long passed. Either party has a reasonable chance of gaining majority status in either house. The result is constant warfare on the part of the minority party, in each house, in an attempt to win a majority of seats in the next election. We see constant, highly charged, partisan guerrilla warfare, with the hope that the majority party will fail to accomplish anything, and can be held up to the electorate as such.
There is no likely cure for this condition. In fact, several factors make it probable that the situation will get worse.
1. The ideological divide between the two parties, and within the politically active electorate, has widened, and is moire likely to widen, rather than narrow. This ideological divide is itself being used to energize politically active supporters; this alone suggests that it will widen.
2. The federal government's involvement in funding and regulating daily activities has increased by several orders of magnitude since the early 1960s. This has created a “bigger pie” of issues over which the parties can fight.
3. The federal government, and many state governments, are rapidly approaching insolvency. Given the magnitude of government's role in the economy at all levels, both parties are heavily occupied with attempting to show how we can solve the fiscal train wrecks without real pain. There is no way. Politicians on both sides of the aisle are so frightened of the consequences of cutting any significant federal program, that Congress wouldn't even agree to form a bipartisan commission to study debt reduction. Such a commission is one of the last great refuges of political cowards, so our senators and congressmen must be really scared.
Where do we go from here? We don't go to any useful place. We keep hurtling toward the fiscal abyss, with the money throttle on high, and no serious possibility of a tax increase. Now, all together now, everyone raise their hand who thinks that Congress would use the proceeds from a tax increase to reduce the deficit, rather than increase spending. Hmmm... thought so.
What made these many positive milestones possible? A permanent legislative minority. Republicans formed a “loyal opposition”, one that knew it could not achieve majority status in the near term. It's true that the two parties weren't nearly as far apart ideologically as they are now, but the long term minority status of a single party, in a two party system, led to a significant amount of true bipartisan cooperation. With no near term hope of winning a majority of seats in either house, there was no need for continuous legislative conflict in order to try to gain advantage in the next election.
This situation is long passed. Either party has a reasonable chance of gaining majority status in either house. The result is constant warfare on the part of the minority party, in each house, in an attempt to win a majority of seats in the next election. We see constant, highly charged, partisan guerrilla warfare, with the hope that the majority party will fail to accomplish anything, and can be held up to the electorate as such.
There is no likely cure for this condition. In fact, several factors make it probable that the situation will get worse.
1. The ideological divide between the two parties, and within the politically active electorate, has widened, and is moire likely to widen, rather than narrow. This ideological divide is itself being used to energize politically active supporters; this alone suggests that it will widen.
2. The federal government's involvement in funding and regulating daily activities has increased by several orders of magnitude since the early 1960s. This has created a “bigger pie” of issues over which the parties can fight.
3. The federal government, and many state governments, are rapidly approaching insolvency. Given the magnitude of government's role in the economy at all levels, both parties are heavily occupied with attempting to show how we can solve the fiscal train wrecks without real pain. There is no way. Politicians on both sides of the aisle are so frightened of the consequences of cutting any significant federal program, that Congress wouldn't even agree to form a bipartisan commission to study debt reduction. Such a commission is one of the last great refuges of political cowards, so our senators and congressmen must be really scared.
Where do we go from here? We don't go to any useful place. We keep hurtling toward the fiscal abyss, with the money throttle on high, and no serious possibility of a tax increase. Now, all together now, everyone raise their hand who thinks that Congress would use the proceeds from a tax increase to reduce the deficit, rather than increase spending. Hmmm... thought so.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Do We Understand Where We've Been in the Last Three Years?
Do we? Our investment banks are still dealing in derivatives, using a 30:1 leverage ratio. You didn't really think that that they could rack up such profits without using other peoples' money, did you? Since Senator Chris Dodd announced his retirement, he has been willing to consider some type of reforms, but given how bland and ineffective the reforms are likely to be, one might imagine that he could have the decency to speak on behalf of the public concerning how little reform we are likely to get, even under the best of circumstances. The Democrats, a clear majority in Congress, seem to be in single minded pursuit of the financial consumer protection agency. This will thoroughly mask the fact that there will be little reform of those elements that nearly brought down our economy. It's not treason, but it is disgusting.
A Note on the Picture
The photo of me appearing on the blog was taken about six years ago. I've not aged well since then.
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Rational Market
Justin Fox has written a book called “The Myth of the Rational Market.” As one might imagine, it's carefully aimed at the recent financial ex/implosion. Fox thoroughly describes the theory and history of the rational market, that is, the theory that “markets” will tend toward behavior that will prevent them from collapsing. Fox shows the holes in this theory, but his assumptions and conclusions are only partially correct.
Markets are not homogeneous entities. They operate on multiple levels, with different levels exercising differing degrees of control over market behavior. Those in control of financial markets acted rationally. As financial markets expanded, they required more and more product. Derivatives, specifically those whose value were based on second and third order extensions to sub prime mortgages, filled the need for product. The beauty of these second and third order derivatives was that they required no additional entities of value in order to be created; they were based purely on faith in the value of the mortgages themselves, and on the underlying derivatives that were based on the underling mortgages. Still with me? Those creating these derivatives were well aware of their worthless nature. The goal was to sell the products quickly, getting them off the books, and in the process, generating a sales commission on every transaction. This made the originator of the product wealthy, while removing any responsibility for the product's future value from the originator. The originators had no need for future market health, as they no longer required a stake in the market. The new owners were just typical semi-passive residents of the back end of a speculative bubble. The entire rationale for the market's existence was simply to generate sales commissions, not to serve as a place where derivatives were traded. That trading was just a vehicle. In another time, the same traders might have dealt in precious metals (though they are problematic from a speculative point of view, since they do have some intrinsic value), tulip bulbs, or fictional railroad shares. It doesn't matter what the product is; whatever the product is, it simply has to exist at some existential level.
Ironically, investors in mortgage backed securities had ample opportunity to learn of their lack of worth. While brokers hyped these products, Gretchen Morgenson and Joe Nocera, of the New York Times, were accurately describing them as junk, at least two years before the crash. In another remarkable twist of irony, the banks and brokerage houses ended up caught with billions of dollars worth of these worthless securities (now so appropriately named toxic assets), while many of their own traders walked away with fortunes enough to retire to the French Riviera.
So, here we had the freest of free markets, wholly unregulated, thanks to the lobbying efforts of the investment houses and banks themselves. The investment houses could work with these derivative products in any way they saw fit, short of out and out fraud. The result? A web so tangled, with assets so arcane, that the CEOs of these investment houses couldn't understand them. They do conduct risk management at those brokerages and investment banks, don't they? Well no matter, the criminals who perpetrated this crime-less crime were made whole, their fortunes intact. Those who were sold this crap saw their fortunes, however slim, evaporate. The free market was very free indeed, punishing idiots, while rewarding those who understood the territory. The irony continues. Congressional windbags have had much to say about how bad things were, but they can't agree on regulation to prevent another blow up. The financial lobby still wants an unregulated derivatives market. Now that's the best Congress money can buy, and it's a market that has preserved itself. Caveat emptor? O tempora, o mores!
Markets are not homogeneous entities. They operate on multiple levels, with different levels exercising differing degrees of control over market behavior. Those in control of financial markets acted rationally. As financial markets expanded, they required more and more product. Derivatives, specifically those whose value were based on second and third order extensions to sub prime mortgages, filled the need for product. The beauty of these second and third order derivatives was that they required no additional entities of value in order to be created; they were based purely on faith in the value of the mortgages themselves, and on the underlying derivatives that were based on the underling mortgages. Still with me? Those creating these derivatives were well aware of their worthless nature. The goal was to sell the products quickly, getting them off the books, and in the process, generating a sales commission on every transaction. This made the originator of the product wealthy, while removing any responsibility for the product's future value from the originator. The originators had no need for future market health, as they no longer required a stake in the market. The new owners were just typical semi-passive residents of the back end of a speculative bubble. The entire rationale for the market's existence was simply to generate sales commissions, not to serve as a place where derivatives were traded. That trading was just a vehicle. In another time, the same traders might have dealt in precious metals (though they are problematic from a speculative point of view, since they do have some intrinsic value), tulip bulbs, or fictional railroad shares. It doesn't matter what the product is; whatever the product is, it simply has to exist at some existential level.
Ironically, investors in mortgage backed securities had ample opportunity to learn of their lack of worth. While brokers hyped these products, Gretchen Morgenson and Joe Nocera, of the New York Times, were accurately describing them as junk, at least two years before the crash. In another remarkable twist of irony, the banks and brokerage houses ended up caught with billions of dollars worth of these worthless securities (now so appropriately named toxic assets), while many of their own traders walked away with fortunes enough to retire to the French Riviera.
So, here we had the freest of free markets, wholly unregulated, thanks to the lobbying efforts of the investment houses and banks themselves. The investment houses could work with these derivative products in any way they saw fit, short of out and out fraud. The result? A web so tangled, with assets so arcane, that the CEOs of these investment houses couldn't understand them. They do conduct risk management at those brokerages and investment banks, don't they? Well no matter, the criminals who perpetrated this crime-less crime were made whole, their fortunes intact. Those who were sold this crap saw their fortunes, however slim, evaporate. The free market was very free indeed, punishing idiots, while rewarding those who understood the territory. The irony continues. Congressional windbags have had much to say about how bad things were, but they can't agree on regulation to prevent another blow up. The financial lobby still wants an unregulated derivatives market. Now that's the best Congress money can buy, and it's a market that has preserved itself. Caveat emptor? O tempora, o mores!
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